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American Law and Economics Review Advance Access originally published online on March 17, 2006
American Law and Economics Review 2006 8(1):143-180; doi:10.1093/aler/ahj003
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© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of Federal Judges, 1869–2002

Albert Yoon

Northwestern University School of Law

Send correspondence to: Albert Yoon, Northwestern University School of Law, 357 E. Chicago Ave., Chicago, IL 60611; Phone: (312) 503-3497; E-mail: alberthyoon{at}law.northwestern.edu.

When Article III judges conclude active service, they effectively abdicate their seat and enable the president and Senate to select a successor. Some judicial scholars have concluded that political factors—both within and across institutions—largely influence this decision. Analyzing judicial turnover, year by year, this article finds that judges have increasingly synchronized their departure from active service with qualifying for their judicial pension. By comparison, political and institutional factors appear to have little influence on turnover rates. These findings contradict much of the existing scholarship on judicial turnover and also offer more viable alternatives for judicial reform.


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