American Law and Economics Review V4 N2 2002 (295-313)
© 2002 American Law and Economics Association
Article |
The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket's Hanging
Centre College
Send correspondence to: David A. Anderson, Department of Economics, Centre College, 600 West Walnut Street, Danville, KY 40422; Fax: (859) 236-7925; E-mail: David{at}Centre.edu.
Abstract
The tenet that harsher penalties could substantially reduce crime rates rests on the assumption that currently active criminals weigh the costs and benefits of their contemplated acts. Existing and proposed crime strategies exhibit this belief, as does a large and growing segment of the crime literature. This study examines the premise that criminals make informed and calculated decisions. The findings suggest that 76% of active criminals and 89% of the most violent criminals either perceive no risk of apprehension or are incognizant of the likely punishments for their crimes.