American Law and Economics Review Advance Access originally published online on April 23, 2007
American Law and Economics Review 2007 9(1):72-134; doi:10.1093/aler/ahm001
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law
University of Chicago Law School
Send correspondence to: Eric A. Posner, University of Chicago Law School, 1111 E. 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637, USA; E-mail: eposner{at}uchicago.edu
| Abstract |
|---|
The international law of state responsibility determines when states are liable for international law violations. States are generally liable when they have control over the actions of wrongdoers; thus, the actions of state officials can implicate state responsibility whereas the acts of private citizens usually do not. We argue that the rules of state responsibility have an economic logic similar to that of vicarious liability in domestic law: the law in both cases provides third parties with incentives to control the behavior of wrongdoers whom they can monitor and influence. We also discuss international legal remedies and individual liability under international criminal law.
Thanks to Curt Bradley, Mitu Gulati, Daryl Levinson, Joost Pauwelyn, Steven Shavell, two anonymous referees, and workshop participants at Berkeley, Duke and Harvard for helpful comments, and to Michelle Ognibene for valuable research assistance.