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American Law and Economics Review Advance Access originally published online on March 19, 2007
American Law and Economics Review 2007 9(1):135-159; doi:10.1093/aler/ahm002
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics Association.

Is There An Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines

Patricia Funk

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Send correspondence to: Patricia Funk, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Ramon Trias Fargas, 25–27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain; E-mail: patricia.funk{at}upf.edu

JEL Classification: K00, H00


  Abstract

This article empirically investigates whether law affects behavior beyond deterrence ("expressive function of law"). With Swiss panel data, I find that the legal abolition of the voting duty significantly decreased average turnout, even though the fines for not voting have only been symbolic. As for the size of Cantonal turnout reduction, it widely differs between the Cantons and is highly correlated with voter participation before the removal of the voting duty. In contrast to the voting duty, the introduction of postal voting did not affect voter turnout in spite of the substantial decrease in transaction costs. Therefore, in public good areas such as voting, even a sanctionless law targeting at the civic duty might have a bigger impact on behavior than actions which affect the costs of provision for the public good.

I thank Juan Jose Ganuza, Fernando Gomez, Ali Hortacsu, Peter Kugler, Steven D. Levitt, participants of the 2006 meeting of the European Law and Economics Association and seminar participants of the Universitat Pompeu Fabra for helpful comments and discussions. Special thanks goes to the editor John J. Donohue and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the "Kommission Nachwuchsfoerderung" of the University of Basel is gratefully acknowledged.


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