American Law and Economics Review Advance Access originally published online on March 17, 2006
American Law and Economics Review 2006 8(1):20-32; doi:10.1093/aler/ahj002
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Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees
Universität Bern and the Center for Economic Policy Research
Send correspondence to: Winand Emons, Departement Volkswirtschaft, Universität Bern, Schanzeneckstrasse 1, Postfach 8573, CH-3001 Bern, Switzerland; Phone: +43-31-6313922; Fax: +41-31-6313992; E-mail: winand.emons{at}vwi.unibe.ch.
Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgment; under conditional fees he gets an upscale premium if the case is won, a premium unrelated, however, to the adjudicated amount. This article compares conditional and contingent fees in a framework where lawyers choose between a safe and a risky litigation strategy. Under conditional fees lawyers prefer the safe strategy; under contingent fess, the risky one. Risk-averse plaintiffs prefer conditional fees over contingent fees when lawyering costs are low and vice-versa for high lawyering costs.
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W. Emons Conditional versus contingent fees Oxf. Econ. Pap., January 1, 2007; 59(1): 89 - 101. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] |
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