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American Law and Economics Review 2005 7(1):284-318; doi:10.1093/aler/ahi010
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© The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

Irina Slinko

Stockholm School of Economics

Evgeny Yakovlev

Center for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow

Ekaterina Zhuravskaya

Center for Economic and Financial Research, Moscow, and CEPR

Send correspondence to: Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, CEFIR, Nakhimovsky Prospect, 47, Office 720, 117418, Moscow, Russia; E-mail: EZhuravskaya{at}cefir.ru

How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using microlevel data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992–2000. Using these measures, we find that: (1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; (2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; (3) capture adversely affects small-business growth and the tax capacity of the state; and (4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.

"oligarchy ... throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception... ."

—Vladimir Lenin, "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916)


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