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American Law and Economics Review V4 N1 2002 (116-140)
© 2002 American Law and Economics Association

Article

Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

Nuno Garoupa and Daniel Klerman

Nuno Garoupa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, and
Daniel Klerman, University of Southern California Law School

Send correspondence to: Daniel Klerman, University of Southern California Law School, University Park MC-0071, 699 Exposition Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90089-0071. E-mail: dklerman{at}law.usc.edu

Abstract

This article analyzes public and private law enforcement when the government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seeking government seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The article concludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth, a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizing government in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parking violations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes; (2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and never worse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choice between competitive private enforcement and public enforcement depends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense.


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